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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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                 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ISLAND
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    ROBERT WILBUR and DUSTIN
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    FREDERICK,
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                Plaintiffs,
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                                      Cause No: 13-2-00741-4
       VS.
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    ADMIRAL'S COVE BEACH CLUB, a
    Washington non-profit
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    corporation; and JEAN SALLS,
    MARIA CHAMBERLAIN, KAREN
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    SHAAK, ROBERT PEETZ, ELSA
    PALMER, ED DELAHANTY and DAN
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    JONES, individuals,
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                Defendants.
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              Verbatim Report of Court's Oral Ruling
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                BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Wednesday,
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    November 27, 2013, the above-named and numbered cause
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    came on regularly for hearing before the HONORABLE
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    ALAN R. HANCOCK, sitting as judge in the above-entitled
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    court, at the Island County Courthouse, in the town of
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    Coupeville, state of Washington.
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                 The plaintiffs appeared through their
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    attorney, Christon C. Skinner;
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                 The defendants Admiral's Cove Beach Club and
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    individuals Jean Salls, Maria Chamberlain, Karen Shaak,
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Robert Peetz, and Dan Jones appeared through their
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   attorneys, Vasudev N. Addanki and David R. Greenberg;
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                The defendants Elsa Palmer and Ed Delahanty
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   appeared through their attorney, Marilee C. Erickson.
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                WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were
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    had, to-wit:
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THE COURT: I'm prepared to rule at this time on the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary or preliminary injunction as to certain issues and also the plaintiffs' motion for contempt.

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The parties have placed a stipulation of record that will continue the restraint in the first paragraph or first section of the temporary restraining order, and that's acknowledged and I so order. That is the provision that says that the defendants, et cetera, are enjoined from taking any action, including the employment of third parties, contractors or subcontractors, which action furthers or allows, in any manner, the demolition, decommissioning, filling, damaging, destroying, covering, inactivating, altering, or otherwise rendering unusable, temporarily or otherwise, the swimming pool complex and all related facilities owned and operated by the Admiral's Cove Beach Club and located within the Plat of Admiral's Cove.

The other relief that is sought by the plaintiffs in the motion for the preliminary injunction is that the defendants should be enjoined from imposing and levying a special assessment of any kind against the lots in Admiral's Cove for the purpose of paying any costs associated with the decommissioning of the pool,

et cetera, and I'm just paraphrasing that.

The motion also sought injunction enjoining the defendants from attempting to take any action contrary to or inconsistent with the October 27, 2012, motion at the meeting on that date.

enjoining the defendants from taking any action at the 2013 annual meeting -- or by implication any annual meeting that would be ordered by the Court, if the motion is granted, in early 2014 -- that would deny or refuse a nomination -- deny or refuse to accept a nomination for director of any member of the corporation who's in good standing or prevent a member of the corporation to the Board, and the motion speaks for itself in this connection.

Also before the Court is plaintiffs' motion for contempt, and the plaintiffs seek the relief sought in the motion. They contend that the Board violated the temporary injunction in the way that they have asserted and therefore should be held in contempt.

The plaintiffs have presented a proposed order that sets forth the relief that they are seeking, and so I take it that that is the relief sought by the plaintiffs.

On September the 11th of 2013, the Court entered a temporary restraining order which has been continued by agreement. This dispute in this case concerns the future of the beach club's swimming pool. The record shows that the pool needs repairs and apparently needs to be brought into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, among other things.

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On October 27, 2012, the membership of the beach club held its annual meeting -- or the annual meeting of the beach club was held, a membership meeting. At that time, the membership passed a motion which is part of the record in this case. The motion provided that the committees of the beach club were to identify and evaluate various options relating to the pool's future, including but not limited to needed equipment, a permanent pool cover, and repairs to the pool and its building, foundation, plumbing, and electrical system and to recommend the best cost and timing options. The motion further stated that a basic and simple plan to identify projects for contractor bidding shall be developed to guide these efforts. The plan shall also recommend an implementation schedule for ADA compliance from both a financial and legal The motion also provided that the standpoint. committees would investigate and develop payment options related to assessment costs and dues under task 1 and to select the approach that produces the best balance between recreational benefits and costs to members. The assessment total will be offset by the amount of donations accumulated for that purpose.

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And, finally, the motion said that upon completion of tasks 1 and 2 the committees shall submit the findings to the Board and subsequently work with the Board as appropriate.

The motion also set forth the nature of these committees that would be formed for these purposes. Perhaps more particularly the -- perhaps there were existing committees, pool maintenance and long-range planning and budget committees. In any event, the motion speaks for itself.

It is important to note that the motion said nothing about the possibility of decommissioning the pool and understandably so for the reasons I'll get to in a few minutes.

The evidence indicates that the Board of Directors of the beach club honored neither the letter nor the spirit of that motion of October 27, 2012.

Instead, the Board prepared a ballot to be sent to the membership that gave the membership two choices and two choices only. Either refurbish, remodel, and update the

pool at a cost of approximately \$650,000 or remove the pool at a cost of approximately \$200,000. No further information was provided.

It seems obvious that no one could possibly make an informed decision on this ballot without knowing how the Board arrived at these figures, nor was there any information provided about various financing arrangements or any other information that would be necessary to give the membership an idea of the underpinnings of what they were voting on.

The ballot was plainly inconsistent with the October 27, 2012, motion. The vote was 166 to 153 to remove the pool. The Board then apparently approved the special assessment to raise the funds to remove the pool. The assessments were due to be paid on September 13, 2013, two days after the TRO was issued in this case.

So what to make of the request for a temporary injunction to restrain the demolition and decommissioning of the pool. The parties have agreed, as I mentioned before, to extend these restraints or this restraint, and it is so ordered.

I will note in passing that the plaintiffs presented a very strong case for the entry of the temporary injunction had that been contested. The first

elementary that the Board must act in accordance with the governing documents of the association, that is, the Articles of Incorporation, the Bylaws, the restrictive covenants, and the like. If they fail to do so, they act ultra vires, that is, beyond the scope of their power allowed or granted by the governing documents of the association. The plaintiffs have the right to assert this lack of capacity to act pursuant to the Washington Nonprofit Corporation Act and specifically RCW 24.03.040(1).

provide a number of things in this connection. First of all, the object of the Club in Article II is to provide and operate recreational facilities for the benefit of the members and to procure, maintain, operate and protect the recreational and associated safety concerns of the members of the community of Admiral's Cove, subject to the approval of the members of the Club.

Club privileges are provided for in

Article III, Section 6 of the Bylaws and those

privileges are available to all active and associate

members in good standing. That provision in Section 6

goes on to say that, provided that all guests shall be

required to pay a daily fee, as determined by the Board

of Directors, for the use of the swimming pool. So the Bylaws clearly contemplate the existence of the swimming pool.

The basic powers of the beach club are set forth in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Bylaws. That provision says that all powers of the Club shall be exercised by and under the authority of the -- under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the Club shall be controlled by the Board of Directors.

Section 2, that maintenance and operations of the Club facilities shall be provided for, in essence, and that provision says that, quote, "To cause the properties and facilities owned by the Club to be maintained and operated" -- underscore maintained and operated -- "in accordance with appropriate County, State, and Federal laws and regulations, the Articles of Incorporation and these Bylaws." Again, making reference to the properties and facilities of the beach club.

"To adopt rules and regulations for use, operation, and care of Club facilities, not inconsistent with law, the Articles of Incorporation or these Bylaws as they may deem best." And these are among the express powers and duties of the Board of Directors.

Interestingly enough, the duties of the

secretary of the beach club, as indicated in Section 3 of Article X of the Bylaws, provides, among other things, that the secretary shall pick up swim fees collected at the pool, record them in his or her records, and promptly turn them over to the treasurer. So this provision again presupposes the existence of the pool.

Section 4 of that Article provides that "the treasurer shall maintain an up-to-date card file of paid-up members for use at the Club swimming pool," again presupposing the existence of the pool.

And, finally, in Article XII of the Bylaws there is specific provision in Section 2 for a Pool Operation and Safety Committee, in Section 3 for a Pool Maintenance and Improvement Committee, and in Section 4 with regard to the Grounds and Building Committee, there's specific reference to the swimming pool complex.

So it seems obvious that the Bylaws of the association clearly presupposed the existence of the pool, and any action taken that would decommission the pool would be contrary to the Bylaws.

It's also important to note that the deeds of beach club members contain specific language granting them memberships in the beach club and further provides that the beach club, quote, "will own and maintain

certain beach rights, recreational areas, <u>swimming pool</u>"
-- underscore the words <u>swimming pool</u> -- "and other
tracts." Unquote. So the property owners have a
property right in this connection.

It also seems obvious that the plaintiffs in this case, as members of the association, have a clear legal right to the continued operation and maintenance of the pool, a well-grounded fear of the immediate invasion of that right based on the Board's decision to follow the unauthorized vote to decommission the pool and impose a special assessment to do so, and they would be actually and substantially injured if the Board was allowed to proceed with these actions. Clearly, they have no adequate remedy at law in this connection either. So, again, by agreement, the restraint against the decommissioning of the pool is granted.

here, the Court temporarily enjoins the Board from levying any special assessment for the purpose of paying for the decommissioning of the pool. Just as it is elementary that the Board cannot act contrary to its Bylaws, so it is also elementary that it cannot act contrary to a motion passed by the membership of the association in accordance with the Bylaws.

The October 27, 2012, motion was such a

motion. The Court, therefore, temporarily enjoins the Board from taking any action contrary to the October 27, 2012, motion unless and until that motion is repealed or amended in a manner consistent with the Bylaws and in a manner consistent with this Court's order.

The remaining issues are somewhat more complex. The plaintiffs have brought a motion for contempt, contending the Board violated the TRO by attempting to enforce the special assessment for the decommissioning of the pool and by failing to hold the annual meeting of the membership provided for in Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws.

Plaintiffs contend that this violated the provision of the TRO that prohibited the defendant from denying or refusing to accept a nomination for director of the Board of Directors of any member who is in good standing or preventing a member in good standing from running for election to the Board in a membership meeting held for that purpose. Plaintiffs note the, quote, "directly or indirectly," unquote, language of the TRO in this regard.

On the other hand, the defendants contend that the TRO only prohibited them from imposing or levying the special assessment for the purpose of decommissioning the pool and that they had already done

this by the time that the TRO was entered.

They further contend that since the assessment had already been imposed and therefore did not violate the TRO, that failure to pay the assessment by the plaintiffs would mean that they were not in good standing under Article III, Section 4 of the Bylaws and, therefore, could not vote at membership meetings pursuant to Article V, Section 1 of the Bylaws or run for director.

Now, contempt is defined in the law as the intentional disobedience of a court order. Because of the lack of clarity of the specific terms of the TRO, I cannot find that the defendants intentionally disobeyed the TRO by attempting to enforce the special assessment in some manner and by canceling the annual membership meeting. I, therefore, deny the motion for a finding of contempt and for any reasonable attorney fees that would be imposed based on such a finding. But necessarily implied in the motion for contempt is a request for rulings on these issues, and, therefore, I will address these issues.

First of all, I rule that the special assessment was invalid for two reasons: First, it was contrary to the October 27, 2012 motion. Secondly, the Board has no authority under the Bylaws to decommission

the pool, and, therefore, it did not have any authority to impose the special assessment for that purpose. I will temporarily enjoin the defendants from taking or attempting to take any action that is contrary to or inconsistent with the express terms of the October 27, 2012, motion unless that motion is repealed or modified by action properly taken in accordance with the Bylaws and not inconsistent with this order I'm now pronouncing.

The point here is that I cannot prohibit the Board from taking actions in accordance with the Bylaws as long as these are proper under the Bylaws and as long as these actions are not otherwise prohibited by this temporary injunction.

I further temporarily enjoin the enforcement or collection of the special assessment levied or imposed by the Board on August 13, 2013. It was an invalid assessment. Since the special assessment was invalid, it necessarily follows that the members are not required to pay it. It necessarily follows from that that members who have not paid the special assessment remain members in good standing and are, therefore, entitled to vote at membership meetings and are eligible to serve as directors if they are otherwise in good standing.

I recognize that heretofore there might have been an issue about that, but, as I said before, the motion for contempt places this issue squarely before the Court and so I'm making this ruling.

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I temporarily enjoin the defendants from taking any action that would characterize or attempt to characterize any person who has not paid the August 13, 2013, special assessment as a member not in good standing under the Bylaws.

As far as plaintiffs' motion to require the Board to hold the annual meeting is concerned, the motion is granted. There is nothing in the TRO that restrained the Board from holding the annual meeting and, therefore, the Board should have held the meeting I order the under Article IV, Section 1 of the Bylaws. defendants to hold the annual meeting as soon as The comments about the timing for December possible. It doesn't seem possible under the time are noted. requirements of the Bylaws to do that, and even if it were possible to give the necessary notices to members of the meeting, it is certainly appropriate, as counsel has indicated, that the meeting not be held prior to the first of January. So I will order that the meeting be held as soon as possible under the terms of the Bylaws which require certain notices to be given sometime after the first of the year.

Only a nominal bond would be appropriate in this matter so I condition this temporary injunction on the posting of the bond at \$100.

That would conclude my ruling, and it's going to take you a while, I would suggest, to write this up in a manner consistent with my oral pronouncement, so I would ask that counsel work with the Court's oral pronouncement to prepare the necessary orders or order, and present those in due course. If there's some time crunch on this to get it done, I'll be available by telephone, if necessary, to entertain any questions about the form of the order next week. So I appreciate that. That will conclude our hearing today, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much.

MR. SKINNER: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, the proceedings in this matter were concluded for the day.)

CERTIFICATE

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Jeanne M. Wells, RPR CCR #: 2298

December 3, 2013

I, JEANNE M. WELLS, do hereby certify that the foregoing verbatim report of the Court's oral ruling was taken by me and completed on Wednesday, November 27, 2013, and thereafter, transcribed by me by means of computer-aided transcription;

That I am not a relative, employee, attorney, or counsel of any such party to this action or relative or employee of any such attorney or counsel, and I am not financially interested in the said action or the outcome thereof;

That I am herewith retaining the original and emailing copies to Christon C. Skinner, Vasudev N. Addanki, David R. Greenberg, and Marilee C. Erickson.