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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
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                 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ISLAND
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    ROBERT WILBUR,
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                 Plaintiff,
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       VS.
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    ADMIRAL'S COVE BEACH CLUB, a
    Washington non-profit
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    Corporation;
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                 Defendant.
                                       Cause No: 13-2-00741-4
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    SUE CORLISS,
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                 Intervenor,
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       VS.
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    DUSTIN FREDERICK, ROBERT
    WILBUR, ADMIRAL'S COVE BEACH
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    CLUB, a Washington non-profit )
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    corporation, and its BOARD OF )
    DIRECTORS,
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                 Defendants.
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                  Verbatim Report of Proceedings
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                 BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Friday,
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    September 1, 2017, the above-named and numbered cause
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    came on regularly for hearing before the HONORABLE
    ALAN R. HANCOCK, sitting as judge in the above-entitled
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    court, at the Island County Courthouse, in the town of
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Coupeville, state of Washington.
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                The plaintiff appeared through his attorney,
    Sarah E. Gruel;
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                 The defendant Admiral's Cove Beach Club
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    appeared through its attorney, Christopher J. Nye;
                 The intervenor appeared through her
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    attorney, Jay Carlson.
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                WHEREUPON, the following proceedings were
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    had, to-wit:
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13
                                                     PAGE
14
    By Mr. Nye
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    By Ms. Gruel . . . . .
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    By Mr. Carlson . . . . . . .
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17
    By Mr. Nye (rebuttal) . . . . .
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    Court's Ruling . . . . . .
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Superior Court. This is Cause Number 13-2-741-4, Wilbur v. Corliss. The Admiral's Cove Beach Club is also a party, as are others, perhaps, and we are here this morning for a hearing on the Admiral's Cove Beach Club's motion for summary judgment regarding the validity of the 2013 ballot to decommission the pool. I received and read all of the papers and pleadings that have been submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion. Fortunately, we have some time here this morning so I don't need to limit you in your arguments. And we'll proceed at this time. Mr. Nye.

MR. NYE: Thank you, Your Honor. Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. NYE: It's correct, we're here before the Court on ACBC's motion for summary judgment which essentially raises two separate issues. And at the outset I want to be perfectly clear that these issues are directly related to plaintiff Wilbur's original claim for declaratory relief, not a proposed amended complaint that was never filed; nothing like that, but the original declaratory relief claim seeking a declaration that the 2013 ballot was invalid because it violated the club's governing documents.

address here is a procedural issue that is raised by

Ms. Corliss. Ms. Corliss contends in her opposition to

this motion that it is premature for the Board to seek

summary judgment on claims that are not formally present

in this litigation. Has the defendant ever filed an

amended complaint or a pleading of some kind that would

raise the issues that it is now presenting?

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MR. NYE: No, Your Honor, the Board has never filed an amended complaint. However, if you recall, at the time of the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend he was seeking to add a new claim for declaratory relief relative to the validity of the 2016 vote.

We're not here arguing for a finding of validity or invalidity on the vote. Our argument is that the original 2013 vote has been rendered invalid because it has been superceded by the 2016 vote. And Your Honor stated in his order for summary judgment that there was nothing in the order that would prevent any party from raising any new facts or issues that arose after the date of that order when this vote which we're arguing --

THE COURT: I understand that. I'm raising a purely procedural question that Ms. Corliss may be

presenting to the Court and that is, can a party move for summary judgment where there's no pleading that sets forth a claim upon which a motion for summary judgment can be brought?

MR. NYE: Your Honor, the -- we're moving on the original claim; on the original claim, the validity of the 2013 vote.

THE COURT: Mr. Wilbur raised that, but to my knowledge the club itself has not raised a claim in that regard. Can you make a motion for summary judgment on a claim brought by another party?

MR. NYE: I'm not aware of any legal authority that says we couldn't. Mr. Wilbur did in fact join in this motion. So in a sense he has made the same claim -- the same arguments on summary judgment. It's just that the mouthpiece is a little different than we're used to.

THE COURT: Proceed.

MR. NYE: Okay. Thank you.

At the outset I want to briefly address the Court of Appeals decision, and the intervenor's opposition is based, I believe, on a mischaracterization of the effect of that decision.

She argues throughout her brief that in a sense this case is over, that all of the issues have

been found entirely in her favor, and that is not the case, Your Honor. Mr. Wilbur prevailed before this court on summary judgment on a finding that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That went up to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals said that's incorrect. He has not established he's entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law for two reasons:

(1) the governing documents do in fact give the club the general authority to dispose of the pool if it so wishes, and, (2) the October 2012 motion did not preclude the club from presenting the 2013 ballot to club members.

So with the reversal of the judgment in plaintiff's favor, we're back on even ground, we're back before Your Honor for further proceedings consistent with the Court of Appeals decision. And the two issues we're raising today, I would argue, do not run inconsistently to the decision. We're not here saying the club does not have the general power to dispose of the pool. That's been decided. What we're saying is, even though it does, there are two new reasons, new theories, for why plaintiff should prevail on his original claim as to why that original vote in 2013 is now invalid.

First, that it's been superseded by the

subsequent 2016 vote, and, second, because the ballot presented to the members at that time did not afford the opportunity for any members to vote no to a special assessment, in violation of the club Bylaws.

So we're back -- we're on the playing field again. I use the sports analogy in the briefing. And we're free to argue -- I think both arguments are properly before the Court in the current posture of the case.

Now with respect to -- oh. And it is important to note that the Court of Appeals did not, when it reversed the judgment in favor of Mr. Wilbur, didn't enter instructions for this court to enter judgment in favor of Ms. Corliss. I think that's a key fact here as to why we're just back where we started and not now talking about all that's left to do is enter an order enforcing the 2013 ballot.

In terms of the argument that the 2016 vote supersedes the 2013 vote, as I said, I believe that issue is properly before the Court because we're here arguing about the same original complaint for declaratory relief as it was originally pled by Mr. Wilbur.

In essence, Your Honor, the club has simply changed its mind three years after the fact. The

evidence before you shows that we've had some changing demographics within the club. The evidence shows that there have been four annual director elections since, and unanimously, each and every time, every director elected to this Board has run openly as pro-pool. The Board senses that the club membership was in favor of preserving the pool. It's a longstanding pool. It's a valuable asset to the community. It's touted, as you saw in all the real estate listings, pro-pool members, anti-pool members, anyone that sells their home touts the pool as a selling point.

So to avoid further delay, it would only drive up repair costs, and because of this court's original ruling, as well as the fact that the club had its -- the Board had its finger on the pulse of the community, they presented a new ballot, which was absolutely their right to do.

As the Court of Appeals noted on page two, the Board can present a special -- a proposed special assessment at any time and so it did. And this time there are open meetings -- and this goes directly to intervenor's point that the vote was somehow tainted because members were tricked into believing they had to vote yes in favor of the repair assessment.

The actual overwhelming evidence shows

that's clearly not the case. There were open meetings, membership meetings, board meetings, annual meetings, where the issues about this ballot were openly discussed and argued. And anti-pool members campaigned hard. You saw the website postings where they were urging other members to vote no to the special assessment.

More importantly, really, and I think maybe the thing that brings this back -- went against that is the face of the ballot itself. Unlike the 2013 ballot, this ballot clearly had a "no" option on it. And obviously the members were aware of that fact because they did in fact vote down the second of the two proposed repair assessments. So it's obviously clear members were aware of that.

Many of the anti-pool members were present in this courtroom on the date Your Honor ruled on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and basically laid out a roadmap of how they might go about keeping these repairs from happening because they had the right to vote no to any proposed special assessment under the Bylaws.

THE COURT: Let's talk about the vote for special assessments. Clearly, there was such a vote in 2016. The membership, under an election or a vote ballot called under the Bylaws of the association,

clearly made this vote, and this specifically authorized the special assessment. That appears to be in contrast to the 2013 vote. There was no assessment. It was simply a vote, yes or no, on the two options that were presented. What is the nature of that?

The Bylaws of the association provide that the business of the association is managed by the Board of Directors. So let's assume hypothetically that the only thing before the Court, the association, whatever, is that 2013 vote. Was that somehow binding on the Board or could the Board just deem that to be an advisory vote and do what it deemed appropriate? Who has the authority to manage the business of the association?

MR. NYE: That's correct, Your Honor. And I'm mindful of the fact that, when we were back before you in March, Your Honor even raised the possibility, why doesn't the Board simply administratively declare the 2013 ballot invalid? Why do we even have to be here at all? Trust me, the Board has given a lot of thought to doing just that because that does seem like a simple and clean approach.

However, the nature of this dispute within the community, it's very obvious that's not going to resolve it. They could do that. Intervenor and her

supporters would march us right back before Your Honor. That's why we're here.

The specter of this 2013 ballot has been hanging over this club's head for four years, and without a ruling from the Court, the people that are dissatisfied with the outcome simply aren't going to let the club live with it. And, unfortunately, that's the case. That's why we're here. If the club -- believe me, if the Board felt confident at all they could do that and we wouldn't be back before Your Honor it would do it in a heartbeat.

THE COURT: Well, my question, though, is a hypothetical question concerning the authority of the membership, if any, to make any binding decision on the Board and the authority of the Board itself. The affairs of the association are managed by the Board. Is the Board required to adhere to a vote of the membership such as the 2013 vote?

MR. NYE: I believe so, and I believe Your Honor has stated in earlier rulings it's axiomatic that the Board must adhere to the votes and to the motions of its members.

THE COURT: That was my view, of course, at that time. I made my decision. The Court of Appeals has ruled that the 2012 vote that created the committee

and all the rest of it was not something that required 1 2 the Board to follow the 2013 vote. Does that change things? 3 Well, I'm not sure I understand 4 MR. NYE: 5 the question. Getting back to the original point of 6 whether the Board can disregard, the Board did propose 7 the assessment -- and I'm talking about now in 2016 -and it was -- the club obviously did change its mind. 8 And in the 2013 ballot it -- they really were voting on raising the funds to either, (a) repair the pool, or 10 11 (b), to decommission the pool, 650,000 versus 200,000. 12 So it was the type of vote that had to go to the members 13 under the Bylaws because it was proposing a special 14 assessment. 15 THE COURT: So you're -- are you conceding that it was a vote to impose a special assessment? 16 The 2013 ballot? 17 MR. NYE: Yes. 18 THE COURT: 19 I mean --MR. NYE: It was. 20 THE COURT: There was no indication of how 21 much the various property owners would have to pay such 22 as in contrast to the 2016 vote. 23 MR. NYE: Well, that --24 THE COURT: Nobody would know how much they 25 had to pay under the 2013 vote. There would have to be

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some further action to actually impose the assessment,
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    right?
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                MR. NYE: Well, all that was done on that
    was the Board did send out invoices to the members for
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    their respective share.
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                THE COURT: Okay. I wasn't clear on that --
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                MR. NYE: Okay.
                THE COURT: -- from the record. Is there
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    something in the record that indicates that the Board
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    actually followed through after the 2013 vote and sent
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    out --
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                MR. CARLSON: Yes. I'm sorry, Your Honor.
    Yes. And in fact collected --
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                THE COURT: Let's take it one at a time
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    here.
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                MR. CARLSON: Sorry.
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                THE COURT: Let's hear from Mr. Nye.
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                MR. NYE:
                         Yes, Your Honor. The Board did
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    take steps to collect the assessment. That's what led
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    to Mr. Wilbur even filing this lawsuit.
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                THE COURT: Okay. That clarifies that
    issue.
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                MR. NYE: So we were dealing with a special
    assessment in both ballots in 2013 and 2016. And so to
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    answer your question, I believe that is the type of
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thing that must go to the membership for a vote under the Bylaws.

But in any event, getting back to the 2016 vote itself, it was very clear on the face of the ballot and in the materials, the Q&A that's been argued by intervenor and submitted by both parties, the statement they point to that they say was -- reflected this court's erroneous ruling, the Court never said anywhere that members must approve assessments for proposed repairs.

What the ruling was, and I think it's accurately stated in the Q&A that went with the ballot, is that the club had an obligation to operate and maintain its recreational facilities. That was an absolutely true statement at the time it was made.

But in the same paragraph the Q&A goes on to say, well, we can live with continued Band-Aid approaches but that's not what we want to do. We want a pool we can be proud of. So there's nothing about the materials that went out, this court's ruling, the arguments and debating that was going on in any of the open meetings and open forums, the members were obviously aware they had the power to vote no to this repair assessment. Most important, the ballot itself; yes/no for each proposed assessment. And clearly they

knew they could vote no because they did on the second of the two assessments.

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As far as allegations of collusion, again, the information that's just kind of been thrown out there to suggest this raises no issues of material fact. It's what you see reflected in those emails is that you do have current Board members who, back in 2013, did contribute funds to plaintiff for him to pursue this They were at all times openly and honestly case. pro-pool people, and it was their right to do that. They were not Board members at the time they ever contributed any funds. Once these individuals became members of the Board, they contributed no more funds. And then what you do see -- the emails are two parties to a legal dispute trying to find a way out of it in a way that will honor fiduciary duties to all members of the club, the cheapest, most streamlined method of getting the club out of this dispute once and for all. That's all those emails show. And the law favors parties trying to pursue settlements.

The club -- there were some ideas battered around that the club didn't feel comfortable with, which is what led to ACBC refusing to take a position on plaintiff's motion. And we've known all along what we really need is Your Honor to straighten this out for us

so we can go forward once and for all. Otherwise, we're going to be bugging you for a long time. So there was no collusion. There was no improper financial dealings.

Dustin Frederick. Of course he's going to be on emails with Mr. Wilbur discussing case strategy. He was the original plaintiff right along with Mr. Wilbur in this case. He subsequently got elected to the Board and he thereafter withdrew from this case as a plaintiff and the Board continued to exclude him from all executive sessions involving the pool discussions, the litigation discussions. I never spoke to him. He was excluded from my communications with the Board. So I think the Board has done an admirable job -- admirable job -- of recognizing its duty to all club members and trying to be transparent, open and honest, be fair to all members.

In terms of the argument that voting -- that the 2016 vote is invalid -- is invalid because of disenfranchisement of members, the same rules were followed in the 2016 vote that were followed at the time of the 2013 vote. And that is to even have a right to vote from which you can be deprived of, you have to be a member in good standing. The Bylaws are very clear on that point and both Boards -- both -- at the times of both votes recognized that fact and only members in good

standing were permitted to vote. That's right there in the Bylaws.

And in fact, in the declaration submitted by intervenor in her opposition, several of those anti-pool members acknowledge the fact that they on purpose refused to pay their dues out of protest and they know — they know what the outcome of that is, that they're not going to have the right to vote in subsequent elections. It's an unfortunate case of cutting off your nose to spite your face, but that's clearly what the Bylaws state. And so there has been no disenfranchisement of any members.

There's no evidence in this case that any members that have a right to vote were deprived of that right or furthermore that any of those people who didn't vote because they weren't in good standing would have voted no or would have voted yes. We simply don't know. Only the members in good standing were allowed to vote and clearly the outcome of that vote was in favor of repairing the pool.

And so we are at a point now where the club has simply changed its mind. A majority of the membership wants to keep this pool, wants to pay for it.

Most of the funds that were part of this assessment have been collected. And that's true -- been collected from

both pro-pool members, been collected from anti-pool members.

You've seen in the declaration of Kurt

Blankenship that the percentage of members in good

standing has been steadily growing since the time of

this vote. People are paying this assessment. They're

ready to move on. They're ready to repair this pool and

put this issue behind the club once and for all.

Now, with respect to the other grounds of our motion, and that is the technical invalidity of the 2013 ballot. You know, I'm sensitive to what Your Honor ruled back in March on plaintiff's motion for leave to amend. That was a procedural ruling that resulted in plaintiff not being able to amend his complaint to add additional language.

I've tried to set forth in good faith in our brief why, despite the lack of that amendment -- that whole hearing kind of became meaningless in any event because plaintiff never even followed through and filed an amended complaint. This case has always been proceeding under the original complaint and the original claim for declaratory relief.

THE COURT: One of the points about the Court's previous ruling about the 2013 vote and the inability to raise new issues has to do with this

claim-splitting concept that I pointed out in my decision in that regard. And there's been arguments back and forth about that. We'll hear from Mr. Carlson here in due course about that issue.

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Was there anything in Mr. Wilbur's complaint, that you seem to be piggybacking on at this point, that raised an issue with regard to the lack of any option to vote no on the 2013 vote? The reason I ask that question is that there's kind of a subtle distinction here between this claim-splitting idea that if you raise a number of different claims in a pleading, you can then move for summary judgment on one of those claims, and if that's determinative, that's the end of it. That wouldn't necessarily result in a waiver of the ability to bring those other claims that are brought in a pleading theretofore.

On the other hand, it seems to me, at least it seemed to me previously under the case authority, that if one was moving for summary judgment on the claims that then existed in a prior pleading and there was no other pleading that raised a different issue that wasn't addressed in the motion for summary judgment, that that might be a waiver.

MR. NYE: Well --

THE COURT: What's your response to that?

MR. NYE: My response to that -- and I'm trying to be very careful not to conflate the concept of a claim with a theory for why a party is entitled to prevail on that particular claim.

We've always had a claim for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that the 2013 ballot was invalid because it violated the governing documents of the club. And that was the general statement. I believe it's paragraph 4.8.1 of plaintiff's original complaint. And my point is, subsumed within that umbrella of this ballot is invalid because it violates the governing documents, is every argument as to why, in what respects did that ballot violate the Bylaws, the governing documents?

Now, on round one, plaintiff asserted the grounds that the club doesn't have the authority -- the governing documents do not bestow upon the club the authority to get rid of the pool at all, and that argument prevailed at the time, and the Court of Appeals said that's incorrect.

However, also under that umbrella of the original pleading is there might be a technical deficiency with the ballot that was presented because it doesn't afford the members an opportunity to vote down the proposed special assessment. That was not raised in

plaintiff's original motion for summary judgment.

However, that issue and that theory for why plaintiff should prevail on the claim for declaratory relief has always been an issue in this case. It's just that it wasn't mentioned in the original motion for summary judgment.

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Just as if a party may have a viable statute of limitations defense as to why it should be prevail on a negligence or breach of contract claim, that party can move quickly for a motion for summary judgment asserting the claim was not brought within applicable statute of limitations. That may prevail or not. It may go up. It may get reversed and remanded and now we're back. And now there may be additional theories of why plaintiff's entitled to prevail on that same claim, such as the other party didn't fulfill their condition precedent to performance under a contract. Whatever it may be. It's -- I'm not aware of any legal requirement that the party is required to assert in a motion for summary judgment on a particular claim every single legal basis or theory on which they're entitled to prevail.

THE COURT: In any event, we have the fact that happened after the previous case, the 2016 vote and all, and the Court could reach the merits of that and

not address this other issue if it deemed appropriate.

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MR. NYE: That is true, and we point that out in our brief, and I've been prepared as I stand here today not to even mention the second of two arguments.

I honestly meant no disrespect to Your Honor by even putting it in the brief. I just felt that we had a good-faith basis for why the argument is still properly before the Court.

THE COURT: Does it make any difference that the club is now asserting this argument as opposed to Mr. Wilbur himself?

MR. NYE: Well, that is seriously one of the stranger aspects of this case. I fully admit that. Ι think we can all agree on that. It's not the usual course of lawsuits. However, what this club has always done, what the Board has always done since the outset of this case, is try to fulfill the clear wishes of its members. It just so happened in 2013 the members voted to decommission the pool. The Board at that time took steps to collect that money, to fill the pool with sand. Mr. Wilbur cried foul, asserted this lawsuit, prevailed on his motion for summary judgment. The case went up on The Board felt like demographics have changed. The members want this -- to save this pool. It's just going to cost more money the longer we wait. We have

the right, as the Court of Appeals said, to present the special assessment at any time. It was a perfectly valid reason for them to do so. They did. They gave the members another opportunity to be heard on this issue. This time, the club clearly stated, no, we want to keep the pool.

And now this Board has been trying -- has taken the position that the wishes of the membership should be enforced and that's why we're now here, kind of standing in the shoes of Mr. Wilbur at the outset of this case, saying the pool should be preserved. We have a clear statement through a valid democratic vote from the membership to that effect. So at all times the Board has been trying to uphold the wishes of its membership. It just so happens that those wishes have changed.

And so just to conclude, Your Honor, I think both bases for this motion are properly before the Court. I think they both have merit. The Board has done nothing to run afoul of the Bylaws or the decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter. The relief being sought now is entirely consistent with the Court of Appeals ruling. It's just two new specific bases for why plaintiff is entitled to recover.

This has been going on for four years.

We're almost at the four-year anniversary of the 2013 It would be nice if there were a way for this club to sort this out without Your Honor's help. would be nice. I think everybody would prefer we could But every time we've been before the Court and every submission to the Court you've seen the dissension over this issue. It's not going to happen. Someone's always going to be dissatisfied and they're going to do everything they can to prevent the other side. there's no question now that the majority of the members want to see this pool sedate, and the Board is trying to do that and the means by which it's doing it this morning are perfectly legitimate and perfectly before the Court and it's just not true that the membership has abandoned this Board or has abandoned this pool cause.

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You've got some declarations from some very vocal anti-pool people, but if you look at the actual evidence before the Court, members in good standing steadily increasing because people are paying the dues. People have paid their share of the assessment imposed by the 2016 vote. The majority passed. People touting the pool. People using the pool. It's really time to put this behind everybody once and for all and let this club go about the business of implementing the wishes of its members and repairing this pool. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I see

Ms. Gruel here, Law Office of Christon Skinner,

representing Mr. Wilbur. Ms. Gruel is here presumably

for Mr. Wilbur. Did you have anything to add,

Ms. Gruel?

MS. GRUEL: No, Your Honor. We concur with ACBC's motion and we just request that the Court determine the 2013 ballot is invalid.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Carlson.

MR. CARLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. I guess I'll start by just pointing out that the sole and only reason that this has been hanging around for four years is because this court wrongfully enjoined the 2013 vote for a number of years. We had to go through a full-merits appeal to get a ruling that the injunction was wrongfully entered.

All the bases for the Court's prior summary judgment in favor of the Board were overturned by the Court of Appeals. So in terms of why we're still here, why it took four years, that's why. Has nothing to do with the behavior of the anti-pool faction, if you want to call it that. Has to do with the fact that Wilbur chose to come in to court, get a wrongfully entered injunction, and that process took this long to resolve.

As to the argument that you should address again the absence of a no vote option on the 2013 ballot, I continue to be surprised that it continues to be argued before Your Honor. Because when we had a hearing on that exact issue, all of the arguments Mr. Nye made today were presented to you as to why you should consider that argument. And you said, quote, "So I rule that the portion of the amended complaint that would challenge the 2013 ballot on the grounds that it didn't include the no-action alternative cannot be permitted."

This should have been raised in the previous matters that were heard by the Court that resulted in a final judgment by this court, and the Court of Appeals has issued its decision. Of course, that's binding on this court and the Court will follow that, naturally.

So I've been acting on the assumption that I could rely upon the prior ruling of this court on this exact issue and that I wouldn't have to continue to spend money and time responding to it.

So I guess I will state before you the objection I stated in my briefing, which is that I do feel it's improper when a court has made a clear ruling on an issue that was argued by Mr. Nye, he was here at the hearing, I should be able to rely on that ruling.

THE COURT: I understand. I asked Mr. Nye this question. Does it make any difference that the club itself is now raising this issue and took no position previously? Would the club be obligated to have brought that claim -- or theory, as it might be characterized -- prior to the Court's decision previously in this regard?

It's a little incongruous in the sense that the club had been taking no position, neither the decision about the nature of the 2013 vote, and now that we have the 2016 vote the club is taking the position that that should be enforced as opposed to the 2013 vote.

Is the club, as opposed to Mr. Wilbur, now able to bring other arguments that might exist with regard to the 2013 vote?

MR. CARLSON: In my view, no. The club doesn't have a complaint. So this feeds into my judicial estoppel argument. We have -- Mr. Nye said that this is not the usual course of lawsuits. That's true because it's unlawful to do what they're doing.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel, which we spelled out in the brief, rather strictly prohibits a party from making directly contradictory arguments during litigation. They've gone beyond that. They're

not making -- just making directly contradictory arguments in litigation, they've actually gone from being the defendant -- the Board, remember, was sued by Wilbur and came before this court defending the validity of the 2013 vote because, as a fiduciary for the community which had made that vote, it was their obligation to defend it. They didn't choose to come here. They came here because they were a defendant. They were sued by Wilbur.

Mr. Nye acknowledged that the Board is obligated to implement votes of the membership, and I think that's clear from the governing documents, and I think we agree on that. So they are now the plaintiff. They have now decided to act as the plaintiff in this case. The Board is suing itself, as the plaintiff, arguing directly contradictory positions about the 2013 vote.

THE COURT: Well, let's break this down here a minute. Both the parties here acknowledge that the Board should follow votes of the membership.

MR. CARLSON: (Nods head.)

THE COURT: There was a 2013 vote. Now we have the 2016 vote. Under what legal authority is the Board required to ignore the 2016 vote and follow the 2013 vote? There have been changed circumstances. You

acknowledged that the Court needs to address the validity of the 2016 vote. Let's hear your response to that.

MR. CARLSON: It's res judicata, Your Honor. So the opponents of the pool chose to --

THE COURT: Well, let's talk about that.

Res judicata is bringing the same claim and want a different decision essentially. We have a new set of facts here that have to be addressed. Why would it be res judicata with regard to the 2016 vote because there was a contradictory vote in 2013?

MR. CARLSON: Because the Court of Appeals has ruled that the original 2013 vote -- there was no validity to the challenge to the 2016 vote. Let me just read to you what the -- when they had the 2016 vote, we asked the Court of Appeals for an injunction and the Court of Appeals granted that with the caveat that we post a bond, which we didn't do, but this is what they said: "If appellant Corliss prevails on appeal and this court reverses the trial court order invalidating the vote to decommission the pool, the initial vote to decommission the pool would be upheld." That's just -- as I understand the law, from the operation of the law, that is the reality now on the ground and --

THE COURT: We have a new set of facts. I'm

having difficulty understanding how there is no possible way in which the membership could change its view, in effect, and make a different decision on a different vote.

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The Board, in my view, is now MR. CARLSON: bound to follow the results of this litigation, which is the 2013 vote is valid. There is no remaining basis to conclude that that 2013 vote which occurred is invalid. So let's look back to 2013. Vote occurred. It had a result. It was wrongfully enjoined. During the period of wrongful enjoinment, they orchestrated a change of facts on the ground and now that they lost the litigation, which Wilbur chose -- Wilbur chose to bring these matters to the courts. Now that they've lost, they want to say, well, we changed the circumstances. No. They are obligated to follow the law and to implement the original vote of the membership which came first in time. And that obviates and moots the 2016 vote.

THE COURT: That seems a little incongruous to the Court that the 2013 vote would have to be enforced under all circumstances. Take a hypothetical example, perhaps. Let's say that we have the 2013 vote. The membership voted to decommission the pool. Let's say that some legislation was passed at the state or

federal level that provided funding for community improvements, something of that nature, and there was now funding available to fix the pool. Would it be impossible for the Board then to say, Well, we can't accept these grant funds. We have to decommission the pool. There's nothing we can do about it. That's done forever.

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It seems incongruous to me that there could never be a set of changed circumstances that would allow the Board to do something different than the 2013 vote provided.

MR. CARLSON: Well, you know, I don't know about the hypothetical, but, you know, here, look at what they did to change the circumstances. switched positions in the lawsuit. All right. And, again, I'd like to just point out that the doctrine of judicial estoppel prohibits that. I don't know how they're going to get around that. But you cannot switch positions in a lawsuit. So they've switched positions. They put before the community a ballot that said, as the very first point, the Court has ordered us to not just -- not just maintain and operate, but to repair the swimming pool. So the entire basis presented to the community, the primary point that they made was this court's order. Okay. That order was erroneous. That's

just the fact.

So is this court still going to enforce the 2016 vote over the now -- we know now -- valid 2013 vote under those circumstances? It strikes me that -- you know, it may be that there's an alternative resolution which it would be some sort of third vote under the supervision of this court where both parties are allowed to submit material to the community. And I'll remind you that in the declarations it's very clear anti-pool members asked to submit material with that ballot and it was rejected. The Board refused to allow it. And instead what the Board did was it told the community the judge has ordered us to repair the pool. And on that basis --

THE COURT: Any person who followed this litigation and the history of this dispute would know that that was disputed by Ms. Corliss, that was going up on appeal, and it's obvious from the record that the anti-pool forces attempted to persuade the membership not to vote to repair the pool.

MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, the Board members are fiduciaries for the entire community for both the pro and anti-pool. And the characterization that there's -- that there's clear consensus now in the community and, Your Honor, just please let us implement

the consensus, that's absolutely not true. Very close vote in 2013. Very close opposite vote in 2016. the opposite vote was taken, they didn't tell -- they didn't mention about, by the way, the Court's ruling is on appeal and might be overturned. That's not what they told the community. The one piece of information we know that every voter got was what's on that ballot. Ι don't know who looks at the websites. I don't know who goes to the Board meetings. But I know that every single person that voted was told, point one, the judge has ordered us to repair the pool. And it was under those circumstances and refusing to allow opposing viewpoints to be presented to the community that the community very narrowly voted yes. Okay. We'll switch our -- they switched the vote very narrowly. It wasn't an overwhelming vote at all. So --

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THE COURT: You've cited no legal authority for this proposition. Do you have any legal authority that would require the Court to invalidate the 2016 vote because there wasn't material submitted by the Board to the membership that set forth the anti-pool positions?

MR. CARLSON: I don't know about legal authority, Your Honor, but I think that the Court is searching for a way to resolve the discrepancy. I mean, let's at least acknowledge there's a discrepancy. We've

got a 2013 vote which has now been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. There --

THE COURT: Well, the Court of Appeals said that the membership, and ultimately the Board, had the authority to decommission the pool.

MR. CARLSON: Right, which is the --

THE COURT: There's no order that the Board must now decommission the pool.

MR. CARLSON: That's true.

THE COURT: It's just a decision that, yes, the club through its Board and membership has the authority to decommission the pool.

MR. CARLSON: Right. So there are no remaining legal bases in this case to conclude that that vote was invalid, so -- and this is why I've asked you to simply grant the motion for summary judgment, which we fully briefed, argued to the Court, and the Court declined to rule on it because it was moot because you were granting Wilbur's motion. We're back.

There is no -- there are no remaining legal claims challenging the validity of the 2013 vote.

There's no factual issues. And if the judge views factual issues having to do with 2013, then I think you have to acknowledge there are factual issues having to do with 2016. And remember they are seeking a judgment

as a matter of law. Again, this isn't a trial. They're seeking a ruling that there is no issue of fact at all.

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THE COURT: Well, what are the -- are you saying there are issues of fact?

MR. CARLSON: I believe that evidence of collusion is an issue of fact as to whether or not -- and I haven't --

THE COURT: You haven't presented any legal argument that that would cause -- that there would be any legal basis to overturn the 2016 vote.

MR. CARLSON: Well, I didn't bring the motion. I'm simply opposing. So I'm not trying to get you to rule on a motion having to do with 2016, but I think in the fullness of discovery -- and I just would point out that on the day the mandate came back I asked the parties to supplement their discovery to bring it up to date. I got the supplemental discovery like three weeks ago from Mr. Nye. I mean, obviously, we haven't had an opportunity to fully develop it. But I think the evidence of collusion provides the basis for a challenge that the 2016 vote was brought in bad faith, that it could be challenged on that basis, that the violation of fiduciary obligations by directors, which is what I'm alleging in the collusion -- and I'm not just alleging it, there's evidence of it, and I -- at some point

would, you know, disagree with the characterization. I don't know if you've read Exhibit 4, but, anyway, that's an issue of fact.

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I think the disenfranchisement that -- even the Board president himself -- so it's not just me making some crazy argument. I put before you an exhibit where the Board president himself, pro-pool, says, this is a big problem, and what we really should do is send a postcard to members before we ask them to vote reminding them to pay their dues so then they are in good standing to vote. For whatever reason -- and if -- I'd like an opportunity to understand what the reason is -- they didn't do that. Instead they plowed ahead. Days later they sent out the ballot and knowing full well 40 percent, 36 percent of our voters are disenfranchised. If we wait -- as he's admitted, you wait later in the year, you got more voters. Is that a basis to challenge the validity of the vote? I think it I think it raises fact issues. could be.

THE COURT: Let's talk about procedure again for a moment. One of the things I'd like to avoid, all things being equal, is a ruling that might be characterized as procedurally incorrect and have a decision made, potential appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals potentially sending it back to the

trial court because there was a procedural error. 1 2 So I asked Mr. Nye about this issue of 3 whether it's necessary for the Board to file a pleading 4 that gives it then the authority to make this motion for summary judgment as opposed to filing a motion for 5 6 summary judgment because Mr. Wilbur raised a particular 7 claim or theory. Are you saying that it is not proper for 8 9 this court to entertain the club's motion for summary 10 judgment because it doesn't have a pleading? 11 MR. CARLSON: Well, yes, but really what 12 that argument is is my judicial estoppel argument. They become the plaintiff --13 THE COURT: Well, I need to know whether 14 15 you're objecting to the Court hearing this motion on the merits because the club does not have a claim in some 16 17 pleading that asserts this position that it is now 18 asserting on summary judgment. Yes or no? 19

MR. CARLSON: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. CARLSON: But, again, the real basis of that is that I don't believe they can file a complaint in this case and become the plaintiff.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. CARLSON: And so it does -- it is

related to my judicial estoppel argument that's in the briefing, but, yes, Your Honor, I don't -- I would point out also, Wilbur's never filed an amended complaint that conforms with your court's prior order on the amended complaint. So in reality the 2016 issues haven't been formally presented to the Court. And I'm of the view that they cannot formally present them. I -- Wilbur's the plaintiff, and if he wants to, I suppose, file an amended complaint that conforms with this court order on amendment that would allow me to see what the language of the claims are. It would allow me to do discovery based on the language of those claims. So I do think it's premature. And I -- again, I don't think the Board can become the plaintiff suing themselves.

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THE COURT: You've answered my question.

MR. CARLSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: You do object to that. I would point out to you that, to the best of my knowledge, Ms. Corliss never actually filed her pleading in intervention.

MR. CARLSON: She did, Your Honor. Wе discussed this issue previously in this case.

23 Ms. Corliss did file a pleading in intervention.

it's in the case file.

Ms. Corliss was granted her request to intervene and

THE COURT: Well, I went back and looked at 1 2 it -- and correct me if I'm wrong, I'm just raising a 3 question here -- but the Court entered an order granting motion of Susan Corliss to intervene pursuant to CR 24. 4 The order was that her motion to intervene is granted. 5 6 And the pleading in intervention submitted by intervenor 7 Corliss is accepted for filing. I looked through the 8 record, and again, correct me if I'm wrong, there is no pleading in intervention that has ever been filed. 10 MR. CARLSON: There has been a pleading in 11 intervention filed. We filed it as required with our 12 original intervention motion. 13 THE COURT: When was that? 14 MR. CARLSON: I can't remember, two, three 15 years ago. 16 THE COURT: Before we leave here this 17 morning, I need to know whether that's true or not. As 18 I looked through the Laserfiche copies of the -- all of 19 the pleadings in the case which are on file I have 20 access to, I haven't looked through the paper files, I did not find any pleading in intervention --21 22 MR. CARLSON: Chris, you want --23 THE COURT: -- or anything else. 24 MR. NYE: Honestly, I don't remember an 25 actual pleading in intervention being filed, but if

you're saying you did when you filed your motion to intervene, I think that was about November of 2014. MR. CARLSON: Yes. And, Your Honor, I'll just represent to you, when this came up before I checked very carefully. The pleading in intervention was filed when we filed the motion to intervene. been relying on the Court's order saying that that's accepted. I'd be happy to pull the hardcopy file and see if it's in there. If it's not in there, I would suspect it was actually some sort of filing error, but I am a hundred percent certain that I filed it. I checked this very carefully when this came up before. THE COURT: It's possible it could have been a filing error, that's true. I raised the question before. You said it had been filed. I just simply accepted that. But again, I do want to avoid procedural issues so that I can get to the merits of this whole

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MR. CARLSON: It's not --

THE COURT: -- we'll take a recess at some point this morning and have the files checked, and if for some reason it's not there, that needs to be filed --

MR. CARLSON: Yeah.

thing and make a decision on the merits.

THE COURT: -- so we have something that

So --

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shows what Ms. Corliss' official position is in the
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                MR. CARLSON:
                              Understood.
                THE COURT: So let's move on.
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                MR. CARLSON:
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                              Well, so --
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                THE COURT: And, by the way, just on the
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    last point there, I went back and looked at the actual
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    motion, and there might have been some reference in the
    motion to intervene that referred to a pleading.
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    could be wrong about that. There is no pleading
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    attached to the motion itself --
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                MR. CARLSON: Yeah, there was probably --
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                THE COURT: -- as well.
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                MR. CARLSON: I believe that a declaration
    filed with the motion that attached as an exhibit the
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    pleading in intervention, but I'm happy to pull the
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    hardcopy file and check. It's not an objection the
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    parties have raised, so --
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                THE COURT: I'm just -- you're making a
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    claim about the club not filing a pleading. I'm just
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    pointing out that there might be some issue in that
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    regard with regard to Ms. Corliss.
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                MR. CARLSON: Well, Ms. Corliss has
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    prevailed on an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
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    sure if that was a live issue, the parties would have
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raised it.

THE COURT: Well, that may be right.

MR. CARLSON: Yeah. So the 2016 vote's hopelessly tainted by the error of this court's ruling which was overturned by the Court of Appeals. That's number one. We've got serious issues of collusion that I don't think they can be so easily dismissed. For example, if you read Exhibit 4, you'll see that it's not just a good-faith effort of the parties to resolve a lawsuit amongst themselves. In fact, you've got Wilbur, who is suing the Board, actively communicating with current Board members, such as Suzy Palmer, Ed Delahanty, about how -- about strategy for this case, in particular.

There's two things that came up. One is, they hatched a plan where they were going to -- Wilbur was going to file a motion for summary judgment. The Board was going to come before this court and say, Your Honor, in the fullness of consideration, we have no opposition to the motion so please sign an order proposed by Wilbur.

They weren't going to tell you, by the way, we've arranged this by ourselves in secret behind the scenes without telling you. They weren't going to tell you that, and when they came before the Court and

attempted that, which is when Susan Corliss intervened because she recognized, well, no one's defending the Board anymore, they attempted to get you to do that. So that's not proper.

THE COURT: What is -- is there some case authority or statute or regulation that prohibits that?

MR. CARLSON: Candor to the tribunal. There are RPCs that prohibit it. And I'm not saying that Mr. Nye knew about these communications, because if you look at Exhibit 4, I don't see him on there, but there is an obligation to be candid with the tribunal, and if the plaintiff and defendant are colluding behind the scenes in secret and talking amongst themselves about, okay, you bring the motion, this is how I'll respond, and we'll get the judge to sign an order, I would be surprised if that doesn't trouble Your Honor because that is an abuse of the litigation process. The parties were here representing themselves as a plaintiff and a defendant, adverse parties.

The other thing --

THE COURT: Well -- go ahead.

MR. CARLSON: The other thing it shows is that you've got the current Board president, who is Mr. Nye's boss in this case, who funded Wilbur's litigation. I mean, he was a member of what they called

the \$1,000 club. And he -- Mr. Nye point outs, well, when he ran he ran as pro-pool. To my knowledge, he never disclosed to the community that, "I've been funding litigation against this Board."

THE COURT: Are you saying that the Board -you're saying the Board was not candid with the
tribunal; is that right?

MR. CARLSON: Correct.

THE COURT: The Board did not have a position to present to the Court and the Court did not make any decision about the Board's position or lack of a position. There was the litigation between Wilbur and Corliss which the Court ruled on.

I'm not sure how candor to the tribunal would enter into this whole thing since the club did not have a position it was advocating one way or the other.

MR. CARLSON: If Corliss had not intervened, what was before Your Honor was a motion brought by Wilbur in cooperation with the party he was suing. The party he was suing coming forward and saying, you know, we've considered it, we don't oppose entry of the order, and Your Honor would have signed that order.

THE COURT: Well, I can tell you -- I'm not required to reveal my thought process, but I was, in all probability, going to decline to consider any further

matters in this case, until Ms. Corliss intervened, because there didn't appear to be any actual and existing controversy before the Court because pro-pool Board members had gained the majority on the Board. And it was my tentative view at that point that there was no -- it was not appropriate for the Court to make a decision about illusory issues where the Board agreed with the pro-pool forces, and I was prepared to dismiss the case because it was moot. And then Ms. Corliss intervened and off we went.

MR. CARLSON: Well, that may be the case. We didn't know that, obviously. I don't think you can blame Ms. Corliss for intervening --

THE COURT: Of course not. I'm not saying that.

MR. CARLSON: -- given that the Board was abandoning its defense of itself. If parties want to settle a dispute properly, absolutely that's fine.

That's -- I'm not objecting to communications to settle

a dispute. That's not what they did.

They came up with a plan because they knew the community has voted to decommission the pool. That was the circumstances at the time. I, Wilbur, don't like that. They were coming to you to get you to sign an order invalidating the 2013 vote of this community

because Wilbur was going to present the motion and the Board was going to come forward and say we don't oppose it. And whether or not your judge would -- you would have signed it, that was their scheme. And that strikes me as not being candid to the tribunal. If they came forward and said, Your Honor, we've had discussions amongst ourselves, and, I don't know, here's a stipulated order we'd like you to sign. That would have been one thing. That's not how they postured it because they didn't want the community to know that the Board was in cahoots with Wilbur. So what they wanted was an order from the judge to say, aha, see, the Court has ordered it so the 2013 vote is invalid.

So it was a way for the Board to avoid taking the heat for essentially going against the vote of its own membership, and they were putting Your Honor in the position of being the instrument for that.

THE COURT: That didn't happen.

MR. CARLSON: That didn't happen, in my view, because Corliss intervened and took on the defense of the 2013 vote. There was no one else --

THE COURT: I can tell you that I would not have signed such an order because there didn't appear to be an actual and existing controversy at that point.

JEANNE M. WELLS (360) 679-7361

MR. CARLSON: And again --

THE COURT: Just so you know that.

MR. CARLSON: Sorry, Your Honor.

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That doesn't excuse the conduct, right.

The other thing -- the other thing we see is that, you know, you have, like I said, the Board president, current Board president, running this litigation, who funded the litigation. So that was never disclosed to the community when he ran and that prior to me submitting those materials has never been disclosed to this court. He has never recused himself from decisionmaking about the pool or the pool Is that kosher? That's a conflict of litigation. interest of the president of the pool, an undisclosed conflict of interest. I believe it should trouble Your Honor that the pro-pool Board members who funded the lawsuit against themselves never disclosed that to this court or to the community. I believe those kinds of things raise real issues of fact about the validity of the whole process that put the 2016 vote in front of this community.

And I'd like an opportunity -- they're asking -- this isn't -- they're asking for judgment as a matter of law, again, that there's no possible fact -- you know, fact that could challenge the validity of that vote, and I just -- I disagree with that. And I think

that in fairness, and given what's happened on the first appeal, we should at least have an opportunity to test through discovery their current claims, their current position.

And a motion -- a ruling as a matter of law won't allow that to happen. We'll be back up on appeal. I think we'll get the injunction that the Court of Appeals previously granted on exactly this issue and then we'll have a merits appeal. So I believe there are factual issues.

I'm going to wrap up very soon. I'm sorry.
On the 2013 --

THE COURT: We have time. Go ahead.

MR. CARLSON: Well, on the 2013 vote, again, just as I understand the legal situation, it occurred, it was challenged and enjoined, but now the Court of Appeals has ruled all the bases for that order were error, which means that it's valid. There's currently nothing rendering invalid the 2013 vote. There's nothing rendering it invalid. And Mr. Nye said today, and I think rightly, the Board's obligated to follow the votes of its membership. And the first-in-time vote that now there's no basis to conclude it was invalid legally, it's been decided it was valid and it should be enforced. What happened later is now moot. It is

mooted by the reversal of the Court of Appeals.

THE COURT: So you are contending that there are no possible circumstances under which the Board could adhere to a subsequent vote of the membership that was contrary to a prior vote of the membership?

MR. CARLSON: Well, I'm not -- I don't want to go so far into the hypothetical as that. What I am saying is that this vote, given the circumstances and the timing of the decisions in this case, is moot and it can't be enforced.

And I would just posit this as my last point. The Board, the pro-pool Board, understood the circumstances of this litigation when it decided to go forward with that 2016 vote. It understood it. Didn't spell it out fully to the community with the ballot, but it understood there's an appeal pending. It's being contested and there's a very good chance that this ruling will be reversed on appeal. They knew that.

Rather than respect the process, which they are now before the Court asking for relief -- Wilbur came before the Court asking for relief. Rather than respect the outcome of that, they decide to plow forward with the second vote because they saw an opening sort of, and it was a way of hedging their bets.

Well, if we are going to lose the appeal,

let's go before the community now, tell them the Court has ordered us to repair the pool and see if we get a different result. And if we do, then we'll argue, well, if we lose the appeal, well, forget the appeal, forget the vote and, frankly, forget the litigation. And we'll just go forward with that.

So in trying to weigh 2016 versus 2013, which I understand under these facts is a difficult -it's hard to figure out where to go, I would use that as the -- in my mind that's the hook. They chose the process that created these inconsistent results. They explicitly chose to go forward in a manner that created these inconsistent results. And now that we have the inconsistent results, the Board, who's now the plaintiff, the Board should bear the risk of having chosen that process, not intervenor. That's how I think the Court should resolve the 2013 versus 2016. They didn't have to do what they did. They chose to do it and that created this problem in the first place.
That's all. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Back to Mr. Nye for any rebuttal.

MR. NYE: Well, on that last point, I certainly appreciate Mr. Carlson's confidence in his pending appeal at the time. Certainly, when the Board

went forward with the vote in 2016 there was no indication that the deal was going to turn out the way it did. But I admire that kind of confidence.

The -- first of all, just once and for all, this idea that Kurt Blankenship being a member of the \$1,000 club, I'll say it again, he contributed that money before he was ever on this Board. There's -- and he's always run openly as a pro-pool member. There's certainly nothing untoward or nefarious about contributing money to a cause he supported when he was a member at large. It's a ridiculous insinuation, frankly. There is no evidence that any active Board members from ACBC funded Mr. Wilbur's litigation at all. Because there isn't. It didn't happen. Period.

Two, as far as this collusive settlement, we've always been upfront with the Board -- or with the Court about our position on a particular matter and the reasons for it. Those emails in Exhibit 4 -- and we've already explained this. This was talked about at the last summary judgment motion.

Mr. Wilbur and the then-Board were contemplating ways of resolving the case, one of which -- and it's mentioned in our materials -- one of which was figuring out a way to potentially stipulate to permanent declaratory relief. In other words, can we

stipulate that the club is required. The club didn't do that. The club realized that could have some potential problems with fiduciary duties to anti-pool members.

Told Mr. Wilbur we aren't going to do that. We don't feel we can do that. It's certainly going to invite litigation. It's not in keeping with our duties to all club members. So they didn't do it. And in many of those emails you see Mr. Wilbur was rather upset about that, particularly with me. But it's fine and I stand by the Board's decision. I think they acted honorably throughout this thing. But that's all there was.

It was two parties looking for a way out of this. And when the motion for summary judgment was presented, the Board never asked Your Honor to sign an order in plaintiff's favor. We simply took no position. And you're right, were it not for Ms. Corliss intervening in this case, we -- there would likely have been no judicable controversy that would have warranted a ruling at all.

But her coming into this case, in one sense, maintained the status quo of the dispute. You have pro-pool, you have anti-pool, both arguing over the validity of that 2013 ballot which was the original claim.

It is correct that the Board has never

asserted any claims of its own in this case. However, the -- what our motion before the Court is arguing is that plaintiff should prevail on his claim for declaratory relief related to the validity of the 2013 ballot. Not that the Board should. Not stating that we are moving on some claim that we have asserted. It's simply advancing the same arguments that plaintiff would make. And in fact, plaintiff joined on it. So he's -- plaintiff is technically here on his own substantive motion as well.

In terms of judicial estoppel -- well, first of all, this idea that because the 2013 vote -- the decision that it was invalid because it violated the governing documents that didn't allow the club to decommission the pool, that that decision got overturned on appeal is not the same thing.

The Court of Appeals did not rule the 2013 ballot was valid and enforceable in every respect.

That's clearly not the decision. But when it came back, the decision there -- and I'm losing my train of thought on this point, but the validity -- let me come back around to it in another way.

I'm trying to get back to this idea that the first vote -- first in time takes precedence over the later vote. That's an absurd position. I mean, there

would be no reason to ever vote again on whether to propose repairs to decommission the pool if the club were to be stuck with a vote in which members spoke one way. That's absurd.

The Court of Appeals even noted the Board can present ballots for a special assessment at any time. Mr. Carlson cites no legal authority for why the first vote is the one that the club has to live with forever, and he can't because there isn't any law to that effect. Clearly, the club can change its mind and clearly the club did change its mind in this case.

On the argument about res judicata, I think we briefed that fairly clearly. To have -- for res judicata to apply they ought to have a final judgment on the merits. There was one at one time in favor of plaintiff. That's been reversed. We're back before Your Honor. No party enjoys a final judgment at this point. Res judicata simply does not apply.

Judicial estoppel. It is true that the Board, with respect to the validity of the 2013 ballot, has taken on a different position today that it did at the outset of the case when it was made up of different Board members. However, at all steps throughout the case -- (phone ringing) has the Board simply been trying to enforce the wishes of its members at the time

pursuant to whatever vote (phone ringing) was out there.

The -- although there was an inconsistent position taken by the club (phone ringing) technically on that first ballot, the other two factors, the core factors that Mr. Carlson (phone ringing) cited to in his brief, when you look at those and analyze those under the facts of this case --

THE COURT: Sorry, Mr. Nye, for interrupting. We have this -- better answer the phone and see what that's all about. Sorry to interrupt.

Let's have Mr. Nye continue.

MR. NYE: It's usually some poor attorney's cell phone that goes off, not another judge calling.

In any event, on the judicial estoppel point, when you look at the last two core factors that are raised, it's clearly -- we don't have a situation that warrants imposition of judicial estoppel. There has been no misleading of the Court. As I said, the Board has been upfront at every step of this proceeding about its position and its reasons for its position.

Two, there's been no unfair advantage here. Intervenor has been arguing in favor of the validity of the 2013 ballot from the outset. That's not changed. She's litigated vigorously in favor of it, including an appeal that succeeded on the issues before the Court at

the time. So I just don't think the factors warranting the application of judicial estoppel are present. To estop the Board from taking the position it's taking now would basically be to chain the Board to Ms. Corliss at the hip, requiring us to advance her position in this case, which is clearly contrary to the most recent expression of the wishes of the membership and not what the Board is here to do.

I think, again, this idea of being -- having to implement the 2013 ballot in light of everything that happened is simply wrong, especially under that theory that it was the first vote makes no sense. This Board -- Mr. Carlson seems to raise the possibility this Board could go out tomorrow and present a ballot to the club if it wanted to under the Bylaws; that wouldn't be violating any Bylaws.

If the anti-pool members could succeed running as directors themselves, they would be free to do that. These Bylaws provide for a democratic process for this club to govern itself, and at all times that's been the case. And right now this Board is just asking the Court to uphold the wishes of its current membership under the most recent vote.

And I think -- one second, Your Honor. Oh.

And with respect to this idea that the Board purposely

kept members from hearing the appeal, that's not true. The members were well aware of the pending appeal at the time. The Board has always posted the orders of this court. If you go to the club's website, all the legal documents are there and available for all members. It's discussed openly in meetings. So to suggest that -- that club members in the 2016 vote were unaware of the pending appeal, I think is simply incorrect.

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And as far as this idea that the Board had talked about -- were troubled perhaps by the percentage of members in good standing and wanting to take steps to remind the members that they needed to pay their dues to be current if they want to vote, that did in fact I think if you look at the declaration of -- I forget the first name -- Kobylk supported in -supported with intervenor's opposition, he discusses how -- he sets forth in his declaration how it was discussed and members were reminded in an open meeting before the vote of the requirement to pay dues to be in good standing if they were going to have the right to vote. That comes right out of his declaration. So, you know, while several facts have been raised -- I think Your Honor asked Mr. Carlson. I agree. I don't see any of them raise any genuine issues of material fact central to the issues before the Court, and we would ask the

Court to grant the motion for summary judgment.

THE COURT: Thank you very much. I'm prepared to make what many might view as an anticlimactic decision at this time.

CR 56, which deals with summary judgment, says that, "A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross claim, or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move for summary judgment." In my judgment, the rule presupposes that the party that is seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross claim refers to a claim, cross claim, or counterclaim of that party, not on a claim, cross claim, or counterclaim of another party.

I don't think it is procedurally correct for a party to bring a motion for summary judgment on some other party's claim. Mr. Carlson, on behalf of Ms. Corliss, has specifically raised this objection. I do not want this case to be cited on some procedural irregularity, and I think the best course of action would be to decline to rule on this motion for summary judgment until the club files the necessary complaint or a pleading of some sort to raise this specific issue that is now the position of the club and seek to prevail on that.

I would hope that the parties could get

together to allow for such a complaint to be filed. If we need to go through the formal motion process to see if that could be filed, I understand that. Perhaps

Ms. Corliss has some opposition to that, and she's welcome to raise any opposition to that, but we need to have a particular claim brought by the club in order for me to consider a motion based on any such claim. So I decline to rule on the merits on this motion for summary judgment.

As I said before, I do not want the parties to leave here today until we find out whether

Ms. Corliss has or has not filed her complaint in intervention. And if it's there, fine. If it isn't, let's get that on file. It might have been a filing error. We don't know. It might be there, I'm not sure about that. But that needs to be cleared up.

And I was going to mention that I don't think it's appropriate, at least in the circumstances of this case, for the Court to make any decision on the motion for summary judgment that Ms. Corliss made prior to the appeal to the Court of Appeals because that wasn't noted for a hearing. Again, I want this matter to get before the Court on the merits. So if Ms. Corliss wants the Court to consider her motion or some amended version of that now that we have the

additional situation that now exists, then that needs to 1 2 be formally noted. So let's see what you can do about getting 3 4 the pleadings in order such that these matters can be 5 presented on the merits to the Court. Any questions? MR. NYE: One, Your Honor, and that is 6 7 whether the fact that plaintiff filed joinder in the motion has any effect on the Court's decision not to 8 9 rule? 10 THE COURT: It does not. 11 MR. NYE: And could the plaintiff have filed 12 an identical motion and argued it here today? 13 THE COURT: I don't make advisory opinions. 14 Probably so. But perhaps Mr. Carlson has a comment on 15 that. 16 MR. CARLSON: Well, I would just point out 17 that he's never filed an amended complaint either, and 18 so from the procedural issue that Your Honor is raising, 19 which I understand completely, I think we might have the 20 same problem today. 21 THE COURT: Point well taken. I think that 22 would render moot any answer to Mr. Nye's question. 23 Mr. Wilbur needs to file the necessary amended

MR. CARLSON: I will go and see if I can

complaint. Anything else?

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verify for you -- how would you like me to come back?
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                            We can come back on the record
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                THE COURT:
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    just to avoid correspondence or whatever it might be.
    So why don't we take our 15-minute recess at this point.
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    Let's hear from you at 10:05 a.m.
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                MR. CARLSON:
                               Thank you.
                THE COURT: Thank you very much.
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                MR. NYE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                (RECESS.)
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                THE COURT: Back in session. Your report?
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                MR. CARLSON: Your Honor, I'd like to
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    represent to you that the brief in intervention,
    complaint in intervention, I forget the exact title, is
13
    in volume four of the clerk's file. We flagged it for
14
15
          It was stamped "scanned" so it's unclear why it's
    not in the electronic system, but it is in the clerk's
16
    court file.
17
18
                THE COURT:
                            I appreciate that.
                                                 Thank you.
19
    It's Document 97, I see here. Anything else?
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                MR. CARLSON: No, Your Honor.
21
                THE COURT: Okay. Thank you all very much.
22
    We'll see you next time.
                               Thank you.
23
                MR. NYE:
                          Thank you.
24
                 (Whereupon, the proceedings in this matter
25
    were concluded for the day.)
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CERTIFICATE 1 2 3 4 5 I, JEANNE M. WELLS, do hereby certify that 6 the foregoing verbatim report of proceedings were taken 7 by me and completed on Friday, September 1, 2017, and 8 thereafter, transcribed by me by means of computer-aided 9 transcription; 10 That I am not a relative, employee, 11 attorney, or counsel of any such party to this action or 12 relative or employee of any such attorney or counsel, 13 and I am not financially interested in the said action 14 or the outcome thereof; 15 That I am herewith retaining the original 16 and emailing one copy to Christopher J. Nye. 17 18 Jeanne M. Wells, RPR 19 CCR #: 2298 20 September 12, 2017 21 22 23 2.4 25